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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we propose a simple post-Keynesian model on the linkages between the financial and 
real side of an economy. We show how, according to the Minskyan instability hypothesis, financial 
variables, credit availability and asset prices in particular, may feedback each other and affect 
economic activity, possibly giving rise to intrinsically unstable economic processes. Through these 
destabilizing mechanisms, we also explain why governments intervention in the aftermath of the 
2007 financial meltdown has been largely useless to restore financial tranquility and economic 
growth, but transformed a private debt crisis into a sovereign debt one. The paper ends up by 
looking at the long-run and to the interaction between long-term growth potential and public debt 
sustainability. We explicitly consider the Euro-zone economic context and the difficulties several 
EU members currently face to simultaneously support economic recovery and consolidate fiscal 
imbalances. We stress that: (i) financial turbulences may trigger permanent reductions in long-term 
growth potential and unsustainable public debt dynamics; (ii) strong institutional discontinuity 
such as Eurobond issuances may prove to be the only way to restore growth and ensure long-run 
public debt sustainability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
From mid 2007 on, the sub-prime crisis has brought back to the center of common people 
and government thoughts economic problems such as deep and prolonged economic 
recession, widespread and rising unemployment, increasing life uncertainties. It was from 
1929 Great Depression that these problems were not perceived as so urgent and immediate 
as they are today.  
Since then, governments and monetary institutions of almost all developed and developing 
countries have been engaged in financial system rescue programs aiming to re-establish the 
normal functioning of financial markets and of the overall economy. In the meanwhile, the 
initial financial crisis has turned into a confidence crisis on the sustainability of public debt 
stocks. Accordingly, even if economic recovery still lacks or decelerates in most economies, 
the initial support to anti-cyclical measures has been replaced by the insistent call for 
restrictive fiscal policies and the rapid obtainment of public account equilibrium. In a pretty 
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short time span, the alleged return to Keynesian policies have been forgotten; very standard 
IMF-type adjustment programs have come back to dominate economic theory and policy 
practice. This is particularly true in Europe, where the so-called PIIGS countries, i.e. Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, find themselves stuck in a hurry to implement tight fiscal 
corrections to assure financial markets about public finance solidity.   
In this paper, we aim at analyzing some of the economic forces leading to the present 
gloomy worldwide economic context. First of all, we want to enlighten some perhaps relevant 
mechanisms connecting the financial side to the real side of an economy, possibly showing 
how financial variables, let’s say available credit and financial asset prices, may heavily 
influence economic performances. Secondly, we try to provide a formal description of the 
Minskian financial instability hypothesis, that is to say to analytically describe destabilizing 
processes that seem to naturally characterize nowadays financial systems. We emphasize the 
hard job economic policy institutions have to undertake to stabilize financial markets and 
show why public intervention in the aftermath of the 2007 sub-prime crisis have proved 
largely useless to re-establish financial order and eventually resulted in sovereign debt crises. 
Finally, we look at the long run and try to see how long-run growth potential and public debt 
evolution interact each other. In this sense, we explicitly take into account the European case 
insofar as we try to evaluate the usefulness of new Eurobond liabilities to support EU member 
countries efforts against financial instability and in favor of economic recovery. 
We address the above topics by developing a simple post-Keynesian model. In this regard, 
we stress clearly that our task is not to elaborate a complex stock-flow-consistent (SFC) 
analytical framework. In a sense, our goal is much more modest and narrower. It ends up in 
the formal description of a strict bunch of mechanisms at the base of the recent financial 
instability and of the ensuing economic downturn. Nevertheless, even though our work is 
based on a differently methodology with respect to SFC models, it shares the same theoretical 
background. The present work heavily draws inspiration from some previous post-Keynesian 
contributions. Two articles from Lavoie (2006) and Fontana and Setterfield (2009), in 
particular, are the starting points on which to build up the present model. 
According to Lavoie (2006) and, more generally, to the post-Keynesian perspective on 
monetary phenomena (Bertocco, 2006 and 2009), we embrace the endogenous money theory. 
We model Central Bank behavior as setting discount rate on the base of a well-known Taylor 
rule (Taylor, 1993), while base money creation ultimately emerges from effective credit 
demand (Bertocco, 2009). With respect to the Lavoie 2006 model, however, we explicitly 
consider the role of financial operators, commercial banks in particular, and formally 
represent an effective credit demand function. Whilst these last points are already present in 
Fontana and Setterfield (2009), we try to go a step further by endogenizing the operational 
behavior of financial institutions and not to represent them as constant parametric aspects of 
the model. On the contrary, we describe their endogenous adjustments as potential core 
sources of financial instability. Finally, following Lavoie (2006), we end up by looking at long-
run issues such as the dynamics of potential growth. We integrate previous Lavoie analysis by 
considering the interaction between long-run growth potential and the evolution of public 
debt stock. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple post-Keynesian short-run 
macro model, which tries to explain the connections between the financial system and the real 
side of an economy. Section 3 models the Minsky-type financial instability hypothesis and the 
effectiveness of government policies in the aftermath of the 2007 sub-prime financial crisis. 
Section 4 extend the analysis to the long run and to the interplay between long-term growth 
potential and public debt sustainability, in the EURO zone in particular. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A simple post-Keynesian macro model 
             
There is general consensus among economists, both from a mainstream perspective and 
from an heterodox approach, as to the behavior of  monetary authorities. Using Romer (2000) 
own words, we can convincingly affirm that Central Banks, rather than pursuing money 
aggregate targets, now “follow a real interest rate rule; that is, they act to make the real 
interest rate behave in a certain way as a function of macroeconomic variables such as 
inflation and output (Romer, 2000, p. 154)”. To this end, they (Central Banks) “focus on the 
interest rate on loans between banks in their short-run policy-making (and) use the nominal 
interbank rate as their short-term instrument (Romer, 2000, p. 155)”.  
From an analytical standpoint, such a behavior of monetary authorities is generally 
modeled through the well-known Taylor rule, which makes Central Banks’ discount rate a 
function of some inflation and output targets (or, better, of the discrepancies between current 
inflation and economic performance with respect to their own corresponding targets). In this 
regard, the present work does not introduce any exception. Following Lavoie (2006), we 
assume equation (1) below to model Central Bank monetary policy:        
  =  + 	 − 	 +  −                                                                                                                            (1) 
 
According to equation (1), Central Bank sets the discount rate icb on loans to financial 
institutions, commercial banks mostly, by taking into account several factors. First, Central 
Bank discount rate is a positive function of the gap between current inflation rate π and the 
inflation target πT pursued by monetary authorities. Second, the discount rate icb also changes 
on the base of the existing output gap, here modeled as the difference between current 
economic growth g and potential growth gn. In question (1), Parameters α and β stand for the 
sensitivity of the Central Bank reaction function to the inflation target and output target 
respectively. Finally, parameter i0 stands for a sort of Wickselian long-run interest rate set by 
Central Bank once both the inflation and output target are met (i.e. π is equal to πT and g 
corresponds to potential growth gn).      
Central Bank decisions obviously influence financial operator credit policies. According to 
the endogenous money theory, here we assume financial operators, commercial banks in 
particular, to set the interest rate iL on loans by applying a mark-up rate m on the discount 
rate from the Central Bank. This is stated in equation (2). Equation (3), in turn, gives us with 
the “effective” or “credit-worthy” demand for loans LP from private actors which will be 
accepted by financial institutions at the ruling interest rate iL.    
 
4 
 
 = 1 +                                                                                                                                                           (2)                                  
  =  −  − 	                                                                                                                                         (3) 
 
As usual, we assume the effective demand for credit as a negative function of the real 
interest rate, here stated as the difference between the nominal interest rate on bank loans iL 
and expected inflation πe. In equation (3), parameter γ represents all those factors, let’s say 
institutional factors independent from the interest rate, which influence economic agent 
access to credit. In this sense, note that, besides loans to non-financial institutions, households 
and firms basically, we include in LP also inter-banks credits. Actually, whilst these kind of 
credits are neglected in most economic models due to the difficulties to formally describe or 
account for them in stock-flow-consistent exercises, we consider such flows fundamental to 
explain the ongoing behavior of financial institutions and the ensuing effects on the real 
sphere of the economy. We finally stress that in this part of the model we maintain the 
traditional assumption of constant values of the parameters defining the functioning of 
financial systems, parameters γ and m in particular. Such an assumption will be abandoned 
later on, when we will formally describe the destabilizing processes that more frequently 
distress worldwide financial systems.  
Financial institutions do not provide credits to private actors only. They also finance public 
deficit in exchange of T-bonds. In equation (4), LG stands for total financial needs of domestic 
governments, which depend on two components: primary deficit ∆ and interest payments on 
the stock of accumulated debt D.   
  = Δ, ,  ,  +  = , ,  −   − 	 +                                                                                  (4) 
 
In equation (4), primary deficit ∆ obviously depends positively on government purchases G 
for both current expenditures and public investments, and negatively on taxation level T.  
Beside this, we also assume that policy makers may be induced to reduce primary deficit, and 
eventually run a surplus (i.e. in this paper a negative value of ∆), the higher is the prevailing 
interest rate iL or the higher is public debt-to-GDP ratio (D/Y)=d.  
Last but not least, equation (5) below describes the current growth rate of the economic 
system g. According to Lavoie (2006), it may represent a sort of IS curve expressed in growth 
terms. Following Fontana and Setterfield (2009), we assume g to depend positively on the 
amount of loans given by financial institutions to private actors LP as well as on government 
primary deficit. Actually, the higher is financial support LP given to private economic agents, 
the higher will likely be consumption and investment expenditures and therefore demand 
injections stimulating economic growth. Secondly, easy financing of public financial needs 
may allowed governments to run larger primary deficits and thus to scale up those 
expenditures, let say public investments, which may have direct positive effects on growth 
performances g.    
  = ! , " = # + $ + %"                                                                                                                                     (5) 
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From a mathematical point of view, substituting equations (3) and (4) in (5) and 
rearranging, it is easy to see the negative relationship that eventually links the prevailing 
interest rate iL to current economic growth g.  This is explicitly stated in equation (6): 
  = # + $ + %, ,  − $ + %  − 	 = , ,  − & − 	                                                (6) 
 
With  = # + $ + %, ,  and & = $ + % . 
In the present model we have so far neglected inflation issues. As to price dynamics, let 
first assume that economic agents judge Central Bank behavior reliable and credible, so that 
πe = πT. Moreover, following Lavoie (2006), let assume that Central Bank is capable to 
properly set parameter i0 in order to meet the inflation target in the long run when current 
economic growth is equal to potential growth. Substituting equation (4) in (6), putting g=gn 
and replacing the result in (1), we get: 
  = '()'*+,-.,/+0                                                                                                                                                  (7) 
 
In the short run, however, current inflation may obviously depart from its targeted long-
run value. In this paper, we describe inflation dynamics as depending on the inter-play 
between demand and supply forces. We model this point through equation (8) below: 
 	 − 	 = 1 −                                                                                                                                      (8) 
 
Equation (8) is a sort of short-run Philips curve. According to it, current inflation 
accelerates and it is higher than long-run target inflation should current economic growth be 
higher than potential growth. On the contrary, inflation decelerates and it is temporary lower 
than πT in case of current economic growth below potential. Parameter ψ stands for the 
sensitivity of current inflation to discrepancies between current economic growth and 
potential growth1. 
Above equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (6) and (8) form a system of 6 equations in 6 endogenous 
variables: icb, iL, LP, LG, π and g. Substituting equation (8) in (1), putting the result in (2) and 
then in (6), we can find a clear expression for economic growth in the short run: 
  = '(),2/+034()5+67'*)-.89/+,/+05+67                                                                                                                     (9) 
 
Equation (9) simply states that current economic growth is a positive function of g0, and 
therefore of government purchases G for both current expenditures and public investment. On 
the contrary, g reacts negatively to heavier taxation T and to a higher public debt/GDP ratio d, 
which may persuade domestic policy-makers to reduce primary deficits. Easy credit market 
conditions, as represented by a low value of the mark-up rate parameter m and a high value of 
the intercept parameter γ in the effective credit demand function (3) favor growth. The 
possibility for economic agents to have easy access to credit facilities may induce them to 
                                                           
1 Equation (8) is logically equivalent to the description of inflation dynamics provided by Lavoie (2006). 
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increase consumption expenditures as well as implement higher and more numerous 
investment plans, thus raising aggregate demand and eventually aggregate production. 
Finally, current economic growth increases the higher is growth potential gn and the less 
stringent is inflation target set by Central Bank (i.e. the higher is πT). 
 
3. The endogenous instability of financial systems. 
 
In the short-run model above we have assumed operating conditions of financial systems 
to be given. In particular, we have imagined constant values of both the mark-up rate m 
applied by financial institutions on loans and of parameter γ in the effective credit demand 
function. Actually, this is a standard assumption in most heterodox models and it sounds 
reasonable in times of financial stability and tranquility. However, it surely appears too 
restrictive in periods of strong financial turbulences like those emerged from the outbreak of 
the 2007 subprime crisis on and, more in general, at odds with the intrinsic instability 
dynamics that, from decades, seem to affect financial systems (Minsky, 1989). Let us therefore 
depart a bit from the simple scenario introduced above and try to formally describe what 
Kregel (2007) defines as the “natural instability of financial markets”. 
According to Wray (2007), Brancaccio and Fontana (2010), several institutional changes 
and innovations have recently affected the functioning of financial systems. First of all, a long-
run process of deregulation has been implemented from the seventies on. Segmentations of 
financial markets have been removed and barriers between commercial banks, investment 
banks and other financial institutions became weaker and weaker. As a consequence, 
commercial banks have been increasingly involved in a much wider range of financial 
activities including participation to long-term and speculative financial markets. Investment 
banks and speculative agents have had the opportunity to access short-term borrowing. 
Secondly, a deep process of securitization of existing loans has taken place inducing a “create 
and distribute” practice to replace previous “create and hold” behavior of financial 
institutions. Complex structured financial instruments such as collateralized-debt-obligations 
(CDO) have widespread on financial markets and composed a growing asset part in the 
balance sheet of most financial institutions worldwide. 
While a favorable macroeconomic climate featuring low interest rates and easy money may 
perhaps have favored the diffusion of such financial innovations, deregulation and 
securitization processes themselves have probably contribute to expand credit and liquidity 
creation even further, to feed asset price booms, ultimately to set the conditions for instability 
to overtake financial systems2. Such destabilizing processes are formally described in 
equations (10) and (11) below. 
                                                           
2 The expansion of mortgage markets, as due to the possibility of packaging and distributing worldwide 
conceded loans through collateralized debt obligations, undoubtedly played a leading role in feeding the US 
housing boom. High and growing house prices, in turn, have induced financial operators to assess CDO 
instruments as risk-free, thus raising their price and their diffusion in the balance sheet of financial institutions. 
Also due to the pro-cyclical mechanisms of the Basle II agreement, these facts have allowed to further expand 
credit facilities, to underestimate existing risks, to reduce prudential measures, ultimately to raise financial 
instability.       
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Let assume that parameters γ and m, even though constant in the short run, may be 
subjected to revision by financial operators in the medium run. Let assume, moreover, that 
such adjustments depend on the prices of the assets in the balance sheet of financial 
institutions and of perceived overall financial risks. More in details, we have: 
         : = !;<;, =, < , >= = !, , < , >                                                                                          (10) 
With 
?@?A > 0, ?@?D > 0, ?@?E < 0 and ?D?A > 0 
 : = G<, , < , > = G, , < , >                                                                                          (11) 
With 
?H?A < 0, ?H?D < 0, ?H?E > 0  
 
In equations (10) and (11), PP represents the average price of asset-backed securities, i.e. 
collateralized debt obligations, increasingly included in the balance sheet of most financial 
operators, commercial banks as well. In equation (10), increasing prices of asset-backed 
securities induce financial operators to upscale parameter γ, to reduce conditions set on 
credit demands and ultimately to expand loans. In equation (11), on the contrary, increasing 
PP values cause a downward adjustment and a reduction in the mark-up rate m charged on 
private loans. Moreover, following Kregel (2007)3, let assume PP to be a positive function of 
the total amount of loans LP given to private agents and fuelling mortgage markets, 
consumption credit facilities ect…ect. As said, easy credit to households, firms or other 
financial business activities may boost their consumption, investment and “speculative” 
decisions, increase the price of mobile and immobile assets, eventually raise the price PP of 
connected financial assets. On the base of this casual chain, it turns out to be clear that 
increasing values of γ feed back positively on its own adjustment process whilst tend to 
reduce m. On the contrary, higher m values may produce huge credit market contractions by 
leading to downward revise γ and further increase bank mark-up rate.  These mechanisms are 
clearly destabilizing. 
In equations (10) and (11), PG stands for the market price of T-bonds acquired by financial 
operators in order to meet government financial needs. Again, a positive and negative 
relationship connects PG to adjustments in parameters γ and m, respectively. Increasing T-
bond prices, for instance, by improving financial operators balance sheets, may induce credit 
institutions to expand the set of acceptable credit demands and, at the same time, to reduce 
profit margins on conceded loans. 
Finally, r represents a general indicator of risk and uncertainty as perceived by financial 
operators and considered to adjust their own credit policies. In equations (10) and (11), we 
assume increasing risks and uncertainty, i.e. higher r values, to induce more conservative, 
prudent and restrictive credit policies. Parameter γ in the effective credit demand function 
would be easily cut and the mark-up rate m on loans increased.  
                                                           
3 Kregel (2007) describes the feedback circular mechanism between expanding bank loans and growing real 
estate and asset prices at the base of the financial euphoria preceding and then causing the 1929 Stock Exchange 
crash. These mechanisms are pretty much similar to those emerged in the most recent episodes of financial 
crises.  
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In order to assess the stability properties of the two-equation dynamic system above we 
have to compute the corresponding Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives in the neighborhood 
of the steady state. According to the analysis above, we get: 
J = K?@?L ?@?0?H?L ?H?0M  
 
Two possible scenarios arise. A locally unstable equilibrium exists if det.(J)>0 and Tr.(J)>0. 
Whilst the matrix trace is surely positive, given that Tr.(J) = N!/N + NG/N > 0, the first 
condition requires that N!/NNG/N − NG/NN!/N > 0, or, alternatively, − ?H/?0?H/?L > − ?@/?0?@/?L  , i.e. the locus for constant values of m is positively sloped and steeper than 
the locus for constant values of γ in the (m,γ) space. On the contrary, if the determinant of 
matrix J turns out to be negative, an unstable saddle-path dynamics emerges. Graphically, this 
would apply should the locus for constant values of γ be steeper than the locus for constant 
values of m in the (m,γ) space, i.e.  − ?H/?0?H/?L < − ?@/?0?@/?L . These two possibilities are graphically 
portrayed in charts 1 and 2 below: figure 1 reports the case for a locally unstable equilibrium 
and figure 2 represents the case for a saddle-path dynamics. 
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Figure 1 – Locally unstable dynamics on financial markets 
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Figure 2 – Saddle-path unstable dynamics on financial markets 
 
Perhaps more relevant than the technical aspects above, it is the intrinsic instability 
characterizing financial systems. Actually, financial systems are stable, i.e. they feature 
constant values of their own operational parameters γ and m, so long as they lie in the 
equilibrium point E. However, should any shock hit them, destabilizing mechanisms will be 
set in motion. Financial systems will easily give rise to either euphoric dynamics or financial 
collapses unless they would be moved, by chance, on the saddle-path bringing back to 
equilibrium (obviously, this possibility applies in case of figure 2 only). In point A, for 
instance, process of irrational euphoria may take place. First, financial operators will tend to 
cut profit margins on loans and make credit cheaper. Second, effective credit demand will 
expand thanks to lower credit conditionalities, let’s say the introduction of low-doc or no-doc 
procedures on mortgage market. As a result, credit flows increase hugely and liquidity floods 
financial markets. Asset prices will likely increase giving rise to a new round of expansion of 
credits in an apparently endless process. In point B, on the contrary, all the conditions for a 
tremendous credit crunch are at work. Increasing mark-up rates on loans make interest rates 
increase vigorously. At the same time, credit conditionality becomes tighter and tighter. Credit 
lines are cut and credit market dried. Asset prices decrease, exacerbating capital losses in 
financial operators balance sheets and further search for liquidity. Without the strong 
intervention of public authorities, credit markets would probably stop to work at all4. 
Even worse, there are concrete possibilities that credit booms eventually set the conditions 
for subsequent contractions and may likely leave the stage to credit crunches5. Actually, 
                                                           
4 According to Brancaccio and Fontana (2011), this is what happened in July 2007, when French Bank BNP 
Paribas stopped to reimburse some of its institutional funds due to exposure to US sub-prime obligations, and, 
even worse, in September 2008 after the failure of Lehman Brothers Investment bank. These events induced 
interest rates to tremendously skyrocket on inter-bank credit markets and a dramatic halt in credit operations.   
5 According to Minsky itself, “there is, in the financial stability hypothesis, a theory of how a capitalist economy 
endogenously generates a financial structure which is susceptible to financial crises, and how the normal 
functioning of financial markets in the resulting boom economy trigger a financial crisis (Minsky, 1982, p.68)”. 
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following Wray (2007), financial markets euphoria is usually associated to increasing leverage 
and risky positions6. Even if increasing risks may be temporally blurred by the complex 
technicalities of new financial instruments7, soon or later they will emerge and be 
incorporated in financial operator decisions. In this model, according to equations (10) and 
(11), abrupt revisions in perceived systemic risks will provoke immediate increases in the 
mark-up rate on loans and a marked tightening of credit conditionality. Graphically, according 
to figure 3 below, both locus for constant values of m and γ will move upward, passing from : = 0 and : = 0 to /: = 0 and /: = 0, respectively. A credit boom, like that 
represent in point A, may be suddenly transformed in mounting financial markets distress. 
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Figure 3 – Credit booms, increasing financial risks and the outbreak of financial crises 
 
It goes without saying that the outbreak of financial crises may have disruptive 
consequences on the real side of the economy, on economic growth in particular. According to 
the short-run analysis above, whilst credit booms favor real economy expansions, the 
contraction of the effective credit demand and increasing mark-up rate on loans and therefore 
higher interest rate simply cut growth and possibly induce economic recessions with the 
ensuing social costs. 
 
 
 
                                                           
6 Randal Wray, in describing the mechanisms at the base of the 2007 sub-prime crisis, clearly states that 
“(financial) innovations expanded the supply of loans, fueled homebuying and drove up the value of real estate, 
which increased the size of loans required and justified rising leverage ratios […] the combination of low interest 
rates and rising real estate prices encouraged a speculative frenzy (Wray, 2007, p. 11)”. Ultimately, “the current 
crisis is a natural outcome of these processes – an unsustainable explosion of real estate prices, mortgage debt 
and leverage positions in collateralized securities (Wray, 2007, p. 2)”  
7 See again Brancaccio and Fontana (2011) on the apparently risk-reducing composition techniques 
characterizing the construction of asset-backed securities. Actually, in 2007, close to the 60 percent of new 
structured finance instruments got a triple A rating, i.e. the highest level of security.  
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3.1 Effectiveness of financial systems rescue programs and the ongoing sovereign debts 
crisis 
 
“The most significant economic event of the era since World War II is something that has 
not happened: there has not been a deep and long-lasting depression (Minsky, 1982, 
introduction)”. In 1982, Minsky used these words to express the capability of economic policy 
institutions to tame the destabilizing financial processes above and to maintain economies in 
equilibrium (or, in terms of the present model, on the saddle-path leading to it). According to 
Minsky, this was possible thanks to an institutional arrangement featuring a “Big 
Government”, i.e. government authorities maintaining pretty stable economic dynamics and 
profit levels through expansionary fiscal stances and budget deficits, and a “Big Bank”, i.e. 
Central Banks recurrently acting as lenders of last resort of a widening range of financial 
operators.  
Something similar seems to have been in place since 2007. Actually, most governments 
worldwide have been involved into costly programs to rescue financial systems from failure 
and, in a lesser extent, to stimulate economic recovery. Several banks and financial 
institutions have been de-facto nationalized. At the same time, Central Banks have strongly 
reduced discount rates and provided extraordinary credit facilities to financial operators. 
Three years later the outbreak of the sub-prime crisis, however, there is a mounting debate on 
the effectiveness of these policies and institutional arrangements. Actually, several economic 
institutions now are compellingly asking for a fast departures from alleged expansionary 
Keynesian policies and for a quick implementation of restrictive deficit/debt reducing fiscal 
policies (IMF, 2010; European Commission, 2010)8. Proposals go as far ahead as to demand 
the introduction of a zero-deficit commitment into countries’ constitutional papers. 
Before analyzing some aspects of this debate, a conceptual premise is needed. Although the 
expansionary and deficit spending fiscal policies cited above are generally labeled as 
Keynesian, most of them actually are not. Financial system rescue packages, even though 
attempting to re-establish the normal functioning of financial markets and hence of the 
economy as a whole, do not directly provide demand injections counteracting the economic 
downturn. According to the European Commission (2009), public help to financial institutions 
was in the range of 5-10 percent of GDP in several member countries. According to a report of 
the Bank for International Settlements published in July 2009, numbers are extraordinary 
higher in countries like UK, where outlays have amounted to something like the 44 percent of 
national GDP. By mid 2009, on the contrary, discretional fiscal stimuli to economic recovery 
reached 1,8 percent of EU-27 GDP only. Typical anti-cyclical Keynesian measures such as huge 
public investment programs have been largely neglected with respect to other initiatives 
(European Commission, 2009). Actually, we think the surging rejection of Keynesian-type 
                                                           
8 The IMF, in its World Economic Outlook published in October 2010 states: “Fiscal consolidation needs to start 
in earliest 2001. Of utmost importance are firm commitments to ambitious and credible strategies to lower fiscal 
deficits over the medium term […]This task is now more urgent than it was six months ago (IMF, 2010, p. 37)”. 
Similarly, according to the European Commission (2010): “even in countries with lower government debt ratios 
a general consensus view has taken hold that large consolidations are now required to bring fiscal positions back 
on a sustainable path. Although the fiscal stimulus packages were not the main driving factor behind the 
deterioration in fiscal positions – and had probably only a relatively minor impact on fiscal positions - calls for a 
fiscal exit have become stronger (EU, 2010, p. 1)”. 
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policies may be too premature and, above all, theoretically ungrounded. It should more 
carefully consider the real nature of most of the policies implemented after 2007. 
Perhaps more importantly, the financial sector stabilization packages adopted so far have 
proved to be largely useless to restore tranquility on financial markets, as the ongoing 
sovereign debt crisis seems to witness. In a way, public intervention in favor of financial 
operators, although unavoidable and necessary, have transformed a prevalently private-agent 
financial dislocation in a public collective problem.  
According to the analytical framework above, let assume that governments issue new T-
bonds in an amount equal to N in exchange of toxic activities in the balance sheet of financial 
operators. Other way round, think new T-Bonds issuances to be used to finance 
nationalization programs or public guaranties over risky financial assets. On the one hand, 
these measures can obviously improve balance sheets of financial operators by increasing the 
average market price PP of their private assets and perhaps reducing a bit the perceived 
systemic risk r. On the other hand, however, government help also implies that the burden of 
private agents financial dislocation is now shifted and charged on the shoulders of the 
collectivity at the cost of higher public deficits and of an increasing debt/GDP ratio. In such a 
context, the price PG of T-bonds may easily decrease should people start to fear about public 
finance solidity and public deficits are believed excessive and unsustainable. T-Bonds of some 
countries, let say PIIGS countries, may start to be downgraded as junk bond and a sovereign 
debt problem develop, throwing back the financial system in a worrying condition of financial 
distress. The overall effect of public help on financial sector stability turns out to be largely 
unclear. 
More formally, the first set of derivatives below tries to define the first positive effects that 
public help may produce on financial sector stability by alleviating financial institutions 
insolvencies on their private assets: 
 
P?L?QRL: S = −
TUTAATA
ATV +TUTW TWTV?@/?L < 0  
 
And 
 
P?L?QR0S: = −
TXTAATA
ATV +TXTW TWTV?H/?L < 0  
 
With 
?A?Q > 0, ?E?Q < 0  
In figure 4, such a positive effect is represented by the simultaneous downward movement 
of the two loci for constant values of γ and m. Suppose the economy to rely in point A: the 
ongoing credit contraction is reverted and the basis for a new round of credit expansion and 
economic recovery may be established.  
The two derivatives below, on the contrary, stand for the perverse effects of public 
intervention on financial market stability via excessive public deficits and decreasing T-bond 
prices PG. 
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P?L?QRL: S = −
TUTADTA
DTV?@/?L > 0  
 
And 
 
P?0?QR0: S = −
TXTADTA
DTV?H/?L > 0  
 
With 
?D?Q < 0. 
On the base of equations (10) and (11), lower PG values will move the loci for constant 
values of γ and m up. If these movements are sufficiently strong, i.e. financial operators 
become highly skeptical about public debt solidity, the causes of financial instability will not 
be removed. At the end, the initial positive effect of government intervention to rescue 
financial institutions may be likely displaced and compensated by the negative consequences 
of an emerging public debt crisis. 
 
 
γ 
m 
  A 
 Increase in PP 
and (perhaps) 
reduction in r  
due to public 
financial help 
Back again due to public  
debt sustainability and 
decreasing PG values 
 
Figure 4 – Positive and negative effects of financial system rescue fiscal packages 
 
 
4. A look at the long run: potential growth, public debt sustainability and 
the effects of Eurobond issuances. 
 
The present worldwide economic context is probably the worst scenario policy-makers 
have to tackle with since the 1929 Great Depression. This seems to be particularly true inside 
the European Union, in which several member states appear to be incapable to 
simultaneously deal with the long-lasting consequences of the 2007 sub-prime crisis and the 
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surging sovereign debt crisis9. On the one side, due to persisting disappointing economic 
performances, these governments would adopt expansionary fiscal policies to stimulate 
aggregate demand and boost economic growth. Such measures, however, can hardly be 
implemented due to the high concern of financial markets about public debt sustainability. 
Actually, increasing financial tensions may even worsen the economic environment and make 
any anti-cyclical deficit spending attempt ineffective. On the other side, financial turbulences 
have induced highly indebted countries to quickly move from expansionary fiscal stances to 
public balance consolidation in order to restore their own financial credibility. Fiscal 
restrictions, however, likely produce contractionary effects on economic activity and the 
economy may enter in a perverse cycle: economic recovery may stall and set additional strain 
on public balance solidity; a new round of restrictive measures is considered; ultimately, 
economic activity stagnates and decreases even further. 
What we have just described looks like a dramatic no-way-out trap. In such a context, the 
only exit strategy is probably a profound institutional discontinuity. Actually, when economic 
mechanisms prove to be incapable to self-stabilize, changes are to introduce in the 
institutional framework surrounding market processes, in the set of policies implementable 
by economic authorities and in the range of tools at their disposal10. In the last months, one of 
the perhaps most intriguing and hotly debated reform proposal is the introduction of a new 
financial instrument such as Eurobonds.  
In this paper, we don’t want to see in details the technicalities and the institutional-
financial architecture surrounding the possibly future issuances of Eurobonds11. For the time 
being, let simply define them as liabilities issued by an European Debt Authority and 
collectively guaranteed by all EU member States in order to help recovery efforts of national 
governments by financing long-term investment projects12. On the contrary, let try to describe 
in a simple, perhaps rough but intuitive way the long-run effects of such proposal on the 
sustainability of EU member States debt and on their growth potential. To do so, imagine a 
two-equation dynamic system describing the long-run evolution of the potential growth rate 
gn and of the debt-to-GDP ratio d. Consider the long-run growth potential first. 
Equation (12) below describes the dynamics of long-run growth potential. It is identical to 
a previous formalization by Lavoie (2006) and is grounded on a pretty considerable and 
growing body of literature on the endogenous nature of long-run growth potential (Flaschel, 
2000; Leon-Ledesma and Thirlwall, 2002).  Actually, following Leon-Ledesma and Thirlwall 
(2002), a positive relationship seems to connect current economic growth g to the natural 
growth rate gn, as empirically witnessed by the upward (downward) dynamics the latter 
shows in period of economic boom (recession). In a way, it seems that “growth creates its own 
                                                           
9 These difficulties appear particularly relevant for some countries in the European Monetary Union, due to the 
fact they have lost control of monetary policy and do not manage any longer the currency their T-bonds are 
denominated in. According to De Grauwe (2011a), this fact actually put these countries in the same 
uncomfortable situation characterizing several emerging economies in the past.     
10 According to Mayer (2009), it is interesting to note that most advances and progresses in the EU building 
process were realized during periods of deep economic instability and/or political tensions. 
11 See Favero and Missale (2010) on this point and for a discussion of competing proposals as that proposed by 
De Grauwe and Moesen (2009). 
12 See Rodriguez (2010) on such a proposal for Eurobond-financed “long-term key investments needed to 
promote the transition to a more low-carbon, knowledge-intensive and inclusive growth model (Rodriguez, 
2010, p. 7)”.  
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resources in the form of increased labor force availability and higher productivity of the labor 
force (Leon-Ledesma and Thirlwall, 2002, p. 452)”. Accordingly, in equation (12) we assume 
long-run growth potential to increase should current economic growth be higher than 
potential growth itself, therefore promoting innovations and labor productivity-enhancing 
technological progress. On the opposite, long-run growth potential will likely stagnate and 
decrease should the economy work below its full-employment possibilities.  
 : = Y,  −                                                                                                                                   (12) 
 
With 
?'?Z < 0 
In equation (12), we assume the debt-to-GDP ratio d to play a role in affecting long-run 
growth dynamics. Actually, we have already stressed that high debt-to-GDP ratios may 
somehow induce reductions in fiscal primary deficits by persuading policy-makers not to 
increase public debt stock (in percentage of GDP) even further. These effects, by curtailing 
demand injections (the difference (G-T) in standard national accounting) may easily dampen 
economic growth. Besides this, high debt-to-GDP ratios may discourage current economic 
growth through several other channels such as increasing country risk premium due to 
uncertain public debt solidity or negative household and firms expectations about future rises 
in taxation and reductions in disposable income. In general, a negative relationship between d, 
g and therefore potential growth dynamics may stand out. This is exactly what we assume.  
As to the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio, it is formally stated in equation (13) below: 
 : = D[ −  = \Z+4][[ −  = \/^[/^ +  −  = ΩZZ +  − ,                                                     (13) 
With Ω = `\^a ; ?Ω?Z < 0 and limZ→NΩ//N = ?Ω/?ZZ)ΩZg = −∞ 13 
 
                                              limZ→j∂Ω//N = ?Ω/?ZZ)ΩZg = ?Ω/lmZ − ΩZg = 0 
 
Mathematically, equation (13) simply states that the growth rate of the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
nothing but the difference between the growth rate of public debt stock (LG/D) and the 
current economic growth rate g. From an economic point of view, equation (13) says that 
debt-to-GDP ratio dynamics depends on both growth potential gn and the debt-to-GDP ratio d 
itself. The relationship between gn and :  is obviously negative. A higher long-run growth 
potential gn, by feeding current economic expansion g via equation (9), will tend to reduce the 
debt-to-GDP ratio across time. The effects of the debt-to-GDP ratio on its own dynamics, on 
the contrary, turn out to be uncertain. In equation (13), we assume a high level of public debt-
to-GDP ratio to induce economic authorities to reduce primary deficit ∆ (or to run primary 
budget surpluses) and therefore to lower the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio Ω as well. This fact 
implies that a stabilizing and negative effect of outstanding debt (as a percentage of GDP) on 
its own dynamics exist. At the same time, however, higher public debt levels curtail current 
                                                           
13 Here we assume the primary deficit ∆ = (G-T) to be generally positive at pretty low values of public debt stock 
d, so that the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio Ω turns out to be positive as well. 
16 
 
economic growth, this way alimenting explosive forces. The two derivatives below help us to 
mathematically address this problem.  
 P?'*?Z R'*: S = − ?'/?ZTnTn*)/ = ?'/?Zo/) pqrstruvqrpqrstruvw = x1 + &1 +  + 1y?'?Z                                        (14) 
 
 P?'*?Z RZ: S = − x?Ω/Z/?Z)?'/?Zy)?'/?'* = /+,/+05+67,/+05+67 xNΩ//N − N/Ny                        (15) 
 
Equation (14) defines the slope of the locus for constant values of potential growth gn. The 
sign of equation (14) turns out to be undoubtedly negative, given that N/N < 0. 
Equation (15) gives us the slope of the locus for constant values of the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
As said, its sign is not clear. However, we may generally believe it to be negative at low levels 
of d: the first stabilizing effect will outstrips the explosive one14. At higher values of d, 
however, the initial negative sign of equation (15) likely turns into positive. The first 
stabilizing effects, in fact, will lose relevance when applied to a considerable public debt stock 
and the second destabilizing one, i.e. (∂g/∂d), prevail. Eventually, what emerges is a U-shaped 
locus for constant values of the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Chart 5 below portrays these two loci and the ensuing long-run equilibria when they 
intersect each other:   
 d 
  gn 
0=
•
d  
 A 
B 
0=
•
ng  
 
 
Figure 5 – Multiple long-run equilibria 
 
According to the analysis above, let assume the loci for constant values of g and d intersect 
twice. In this case, two long-run equilibria emerge. Equilibrium A is a “virtuous” locally stable 
equilibrium, in which the economic system presents a high long-run growth potential and 
features a stable low value of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. We can say exactly the opposite 
about the perverse equilibrium B, which is characterized by lower long-run growth potential 
and a much higher burden of public debt (as a percentage of GDP). Beside this, equilibrium B 
                                                           
14 Actually, when d is pretty small, slightly higher values of d will reduce Ω and therefore induce a remarkable 
drop in the growth rate of the public debt stock Ω/d. 
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shows a risky unstable saddle-path dynamics. Economic shocks that would temporally bring 
the economy to the right of equilibrium B will likely give rise to disastrous economic 
processes in which declining long-run growth potential and mounting public debt feed back 
each other and lead, soon or later, to dramatic public default episodes. 
Perhaps even more interesting is to assess the long-run consequences of the financial 
turbulences described in section 3. Actually, it is easy to see that reductions in the effective 
credit demand (i.e. lower values of parameter γ) and increases of the mark-up rate on loans 
(i.e. rising values of m) may produce long-lasting disruptive consequences on the whole 
economy. First, the credit crunch weakens current economic growth and therefore, via 
equation (12), reduces the long-run growth potential. At the same time, through equation 
(13), it also induces the debt-to-GDP ratio to increase. Second, we already know the perverse 
effects that higher m values will induce on current growth (see equation (9)) and therefore on 
the long-run growth potential and the public debt sustainability. In this regard, here we also 
remark an additional destabilizing mechanism connecting m to : . Actually, the higher is m, the 
higher will be the interest rate iL on loans and the costlier will be debt service (see equation 
(13)). It is all but a rare phenomenon to see increasing interest payments on outstanding 
debts to trigger a dramatic self-feeding process towards debt default. 
From a graphical perspective, see figure 6, all these mechanism simply act to move the 
locus for constant values of the debt-to-GDP ratio upward. At the same time, the locus for 
constant values of gn will move down. If sufficiently strong, and this may be the case of 
financial market panic and “fight to safety” sentiments, these movements may induce the two 
loci not to intersect any longer. Long-run equilibria disappear. More interesting, regardless 
from the initial positions the economy is, a market-led run to economic disaster will take 
place. 
 
 d 
  gn 
0=
•
d  
 A 
 B 
0=
•
ng  
 
 
Figure 6 – Long-run consequences of financial panic 
 
 
 
4.1. Macroeconomic implications of Eurobond issuances 
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Once described the gloomy scenario represented in figure 6, let’s now move to the 
Eurobond issue. As anticipated above, let simply describe Eurobonds as financial instruments 
through which financial resources may be quickly channeled towards EU member countries 
without directly affecting their own public finance balance. Moreover, let assume these 
resources to be employed to implement counter-cyclical fiscal policies, say ambitious 
competitiveness-enhancing public investments, which otherwise should have been financed 
by issuing national bonds. 
According to our analytical framework, such an exogenous help would have a double 
impact on the dynamic system at hand. First, current economic growth may recover, this way 
biding up long-run growth potential dynamics. Second, while this same effect will also ease 
public debt management, a further positive effect will emerge due, possibly, to the 
stabilization of financial systems. Actually, EU financial assistance to member States through 
the Eurobond vehicle may help financial institutions to acquire a deeper sense of tranquility 
and believe the Euro project as solid. As a consequence, the credit market interest rate iL may 
decrease and help member countries to lower the debt-to-GDP ratio without the adoption of 
draconian and socially costly restrictive fiscal policies. 
To concretely see the economic consequences of the Eurobond novelty, consider again the 
multiple equilibria scenario portrayed in figure 5 and the corresponding equations (13) and 
(14). Define as “E” the amount of resources conveyed towards a member country through the 
Eurobond instrument by EU institutions in order to implement long-run pro-growth policies. 
On the one hand, such an exogenous intervention, by changing let say parameter g0, influence 
current economic growth and therefore long-run growth dynamics via equation (13). This is 
formally stated in the derivative below: 
 P?'*?z R'*: S = − ?'/?zTnTn*)/ = ?'/?zo/) pqrstruvqrpqrstruvw = x1 + &1 +  + 1y `?'?za > 0   
 
With 
?'?z > 0. 
     Accordingly, the locus for constant values of gn will move up.  
On the other hand, whilst improving growth performances help by themselves public 
budget solidity, restored financial market tranquility will reduce the interest rate iL perhaps 
cutting the mark-up rate m. Consequently, the (: = 0) locus will shift downward: 
 P?'*?z RZ: S = − x?4]/?z)?'/?zy)?'/?'* = /+,/+05+67,/+05+67 xN/N{ − N/N{y  <0 
 
With 
?4]?z > 0 
 Should a EU member State be in serious troubles, as represented by point C in figure 7 
below, such measures, if strong enough, may transform an apparently inexorably derive 
towards economic stagnation and public debt default into a sustained process of economic 
recovery and public debt stabilization. The economic system will move from point C to point 
D.  
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Figure 7 – Possible macroeconomic consequences of Eurobond issuances 
 
In this sense, it is interesting to note that the initial intervention of EU institutions also 
creates the basis for its own long-term sustainability. Indeed, the improved solidity of 
member states own public debts, here represented by the shift from point C to point D, allow 
them to easily meet the joint commitment they assume when issuing the new Eurobond 
instrument.  This point is fundamental. Actually, existing resistances against the introduction 
of Eurobonds stress that they will create heavy moral hazard problems and disincentive to 
run virtuous fiscal policies15. According to these critiques, irresponsible countries may be 
easily persuaded to run lack fiscal policies and weak public debt controls in the belief that the 
ensuing fiscal imbalances might be corrected by sharing the burden of adjustments with more 
righteous EU member states. This argument has obviously some ground and it is to consider 
carefully when elaborating the institutional and regulatory framework that will discipline 
future Eurobond practices. Nevertheless, our analysis tends to  demonstrate that it may lose 
relevance on a macroeconomic level. With all the above caveats in mind and opportunely 
embodied in the Eurobond regulatory regime, such a deeper EU fiscal integration may 
strengthen EU member states fiscal stability rather than create perverse incentive towards 
fiscal profligacy and irresponsibility. In a way, the creation of a “European safety net”, here the 
Eurobond initiative, against member states financial troubles may give rise to a self-sustaining 
virtuous process and autonomously eliminate the fear for global instability. The European 
community intervention, provided that some eligibility requirements are met so as to avoid 
potentially disruptive moral hazard problems, may underpin economic dynamics and fiscal 
soundness of member states, which in turn reduce future risks of new EU-funded rescue 
packages. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
15 See Issing (2009) on such a standpoint. 
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5. Conclusions           
 
There is no doubt that the economic scenario several economies currently deal with is the 
worst possible since the 1929 Great Depression. Economic activity has barely recovered from 
the 2007 sub-prime meltdown and it is now dramatically jeopardized by mounting financial 
tensions about sovereign debt sustainability. In particular, several EU member states are now 
dangerously swaying between the need of fiscal stimuli to support economic activity and 
severe fiscal corrections to ensure financial markets on their own public account solidity. 
Problems are so deep as to threaten the existence of the European Monetary Union. A credible 
and immediate way-out does not seem to resolve such an impasse.  
In this paper we address these hot issues through a formal post-Keynesian model. Our 
work heavily hinges on some previous post-Keynesian contributions, two papers from Lavoie 
(2006) and Fontana and Setterfield (2009) in particular. Compared to them, here we go a step 
further by analyzing in a dynamic context, in which financial markets beliefs may suddenly 
change, how financial variables, i.e. credit supply and asset prices, endogenously interact each 
other and affect real economy activity. This way, we try to provide a simple, perhaps rough 
but intuitive formal description of the Minskyan financial instability hypothesis. Moreover, we 
also show why public intervention in the aftermath of the 2007 crisis has been largely useless 
to restore financial tranquility and it has transformed a prevalently private debt crisis into a 
public debt one.   
We conclude our analysis with a look at the long-run. We stress that, in the present context, 
the above financial instability may produce long-lasting economic “dramas” such as 
permanent drops in growth potential and public debt default. To avoid this awful events to 
take place, a deep institutional discontinuity is probably needed. One possibility at hand, at 
least in the Euro-zone, is the introduction of Eurobonds through which member states 
mutually help each others in case of deep financial and economic difficulties.  
The proposal is obviously controversial and presents lights and shadows. Doubts concern 
moral hazards Eurobond issuances may create by inducing countries to forget fiscal discipline 
and share ensuing bail-out costs with other more virtuous member states. In this sense, critics 
argue, the Stability and Growth Treaty (SG) would be irremediably violated by not respecting 
the no-bail-out clause. Furthermore, the Euro-zone would definitely lose its credibility as a 
stable and sound economic area and its political legitimacy weakened16. 
Even though these points must be carefully considered, we believe that Eurobonds may 
constitute a decisive step forward a full European economic and political entity. Actually, it is 
to recognize that a EU member country default does not represent a national event any 
longer, but it will entail communitywide negative spill-over at the financial and real-economy 
level. Such an event, that someone would justify and permit by blindly recalling the need to 
respect existing rules, may eventually trigger global consequences much worse that the costs 
of a EU-funded assistance initiative. Beside this, also remember that, except of Greece, the 
ongoing crisis is largely due to the 2007 financial meltdown and the ensuing financial system 
                                                           
16 According to Kosters (2009): “how could the German government explain to its citizens that they have to pay 
for the mismanagement of the governments of other EMU countries contrary to the treaties? How will the 
spending of that money be democratically controlled? Bilaterally or by a European institution? (…) the danger of 
quarrels leading to political tensions is large (Kosters, 2009, p. 137)”. 
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rescue packages approved in several EU countries, not to fiscal profligacy. Ireland and Spain, 
for instance, were considered virtuous countries running fiscal surpluses and reducing their 
debt-to-GDP ratios before 2007 (De Grauwe, 2011b). Now they are in the eye of the storm: a 
common European response to such unforeseen possibility is to consider. 
In this paper, we do not address all these topics. Rather, we simply try to show that EU help 
through Eurobond issuances may actually improve the macroeconomic solidity of single EU 
members and of the whole EU area. In case of deep financial and economic crisis, Eurobonds 
may provide member states with the resources required to implement long-run oriented 
expansionary fiscal policies. While this possibility, by itself, will represent demand injections 
supporting economic growth and public balance management, it may also calm financial 
markets and restore their normal functioning. We think these possible macroeconomic 
outcomes of Eurobond issuances must be seriously taken into account more than any formal 
adequacy to existing rules.      
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